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Abstract
Standard corporate finance theories assume the absence of strategic product market in-
teractions or that shareholders don’t diversify across industry rivals; the optimal incentive
contract features pay-for-performance relative to industry peers. Empirical evidence, by con-
trast, indicates managers are rewarded for rivals’ performance as well as for their own. We
propose common ownership of natural competitors by the same investors as an explanation.
We show theoretically and empirically that executives are paid less for own performance and
more for rivals’ performance when the industry is more commonly owned. The growth of
common ownership also helps explain the increase in CEO pay over the past decades.
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I Introduction
The level and structure of top management pay has been the subject of a fiery public debate
for a long time, most recently by all major presidential candidates. Corresponding to the public
interest, a large academic literature has examined its determinants. Much of it has focused on
how board characteristics determine the extent to which pay packages are competitive, as opposed
to reflective of unresolved agency problems.1 More recently, the public debate has moved to
questioning the role of many firms’ most powerful shareholders in bringing about, or at least
condoning, what some perceive as “excessive” compensation packages. In particular, a small set
of very large mutual fund companies find themselves asked why they systematically vote “yes”
on compensation packages that guarantee high levels of pay but are only weakly related to the
(relative) performance of the firm executives run.2 Performance-insensitive pay not only defies
common sense, but also the established economic theory on optimal incentive provision. Why
then do the largest and most powerful shareholders of many firms support such pay packages?
Deepening the puzzle, the approval of the seemingly sub-optimal contracts does not seem to
be due to inattention. To the contrary, BlackRock (BLK), the largest shareholder of about one
fifth of all American corporations (Davis, 2013), recognizes that “executive compensation that is
disconnected from company performance is a symptom of broader governance failures,” which it
is committed to rectify. Indeed, almost half of the hundreds of engagement meetings the firm
conducts every year feature discussions about executive compensation (Melby, 2016).
A perceived lack of power, i.e., inability to influence pay packages, does not seem be an
obstacle either. BLK’s leaders claim to have power to influence firm behavior far beyond pay
structure. A quick Google search brings up Larry Fink saying “We can tell a company to fire 5000
employees tomorrow...” (Rolnik, 2016) while Reuters reports “When BlackRock calls, CEOs listen
1See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000, 2001a); Bebchuk et al. (2002); Arye Bebchuk and Fried (2003); Bebchuk
and Fried (2006).
2See Melby (2016). BlackRock, Vanguard, and Fidelity approve proposed pay packages at least 96% of the time
(Melby and Ritcey, 2016).
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and do deals” (Hunnicutt, 2016), etc. To bring about change, “being able to talk to boards” in
private engagement meetings “is [BLK’s] most important tool,” and more powerful than voting
alone (BlackRock, 2015; Booraem, 2014). Indeed, “we only vote against management when direct
engagement has failed” (BlackRock, 2016), or, more colorfully: “engagement is the carrot, voting
is the stick.” Judging from the voting patterns on pay, shareholders seem to think that the carrot is
effective.3 Given these shareholders’ attention to executive pay and their apparent power to affect
it, it seems perplexing to many observers why they “wield [their] outsized stick like a wet noodle”
(Morgenson, 2016) and rubber-stamp (if not encourage) compensation contracts that contradict
fundamental predictions of incentive theory.
The present paper provides a rationale for why large diversified managers should indeed support
pay packages that promise high unconditional salaries that are less related to firm performance and
more related to aggregate performance. Our explanation combines common ownership of firms by
an overlapping set of investors and imperfect product market competition. In theory, “common
shareholders,” including widely diversified asset managers such as BLK and Vanguard, will aim
to maximize the value of their entire stock portfolio, rather than the performance of individual
firms within that portfolio. (The reason is that mutual fund families earn money by charging their
investors a fixed percentage of total assets under management.) They should therefore optimally
structure executive pay such that managers have weakened incentives to compete aggressively
against their industry rivals, thereby competing away industry profits.
This explanation also generates testable predictions about the cross-sectional variation in pay-
performance sensitivities and the level of pay: increasing common ownership concentration should
lead to reduced pay-performance sensitivity, less relative performance evaluation, and higher un-
conditional CEO pay. These predictions find strong support in the data. Our findings support the
notion that broadly diversified investors do not challenge performance-insensitive compensation
3Magnifying their already large individual power, large asset managers moreover appear to coordinate many
corporate governance activities, including those regarding compensation (Foley and McLannahan, 2016; Foley,
2016). The potential of coordination among BLK, Vanguard, and State Street is particularly potent given that
their combined power makes them the largest shareholder of 88% of all S&P 500 firms (Fichtner et al., 2016).
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packages simply because letting them pass is in their economic interest.
Our analysis departs from but also nests standard models of optimal incentive provision in
principal-agent problems (e.g., Holmstrom (1979)). Such models typically assume that sharehold-
ers unanimously want the manager to maximize the firm’s own value. The question they address is
how to most inexpensively incentivize the manager to act in line with the shareholders’ interests.
The assumption of own-firm profit maximization leads to the prediction of relative performance
evaluation (RPE): the optimal way to incentivize a risk-averse manager to exert effort is to pay her
more if the firm she runs performs better, but to filter out shocks that affect the entire industry
and that the manager is unable to influence (Holmstrom, 1982). The clarity of this theoretical
prediction contrasts with mixed empirical results in its support, discussed in Appendix A.
The theoretical part of this paper generalizes this model in two ways. First, we allow for
the possibility that firms have market power and are engaged in strategic interaction with their
industry rivals. As a result, managers can influence their own firm’s and their competitors’ profits
by the choice of their competitive strategy. Second, we assume that shareholders can hold shares
in more than one firm in the industry. This assumption gives shareholders a reason to incentivize
managers to not only maximize their own firm’s profits in isolation, but to consider the firm’s
rivals’ profits as well.
Our model predicts that RPE is optimal when each firm is owned by a different investor or
each firm’s strategic decision does not influence its competitors. However, if the most powerful
shareholders of a firm also own large stakes in the firm’s competitors, shareholders do not want
to incentivize managers to compete aggressively (e.g., to engage in price wars to increase market
share). Instead, they choose to reward top managers more for industry profits, irrespective of
whether the profits come from the firms the managers actually run or from the firms against
which they compete. Hence, in equilibrium, common ownership decreases the optimal incentive
slope on own-firm performance and increases the optimal managerial reward for rival firms’ profits.
Importantly, and in stark contrast to extant work on top management incentives under imperfect
competition, these results obtain independent of the mode of competition (Cournot or Bertrand).
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We further show that common ownership leads to higher unconditional CEO compensation
levels. The reason is that common ownership makes not benchmarking pay packages against
aggregate industry fluctuations opportune, thus rendering managerial pay packages riskier than
they would be if common industry shocks were filtered out. Risk-averse managers with a given
outside option therefore demand higher baseline pay as compensation for the additional risk.
On the empirical side, we begin by documenting the extent to which the same set of diversified
investors own natural competitors in U.S. industries. Specifically, as a novel contribution of our
paper is to document in how many firms and in which fraction of firms a particular investor is
among the top shareholders. For example, both BlackRock and Vanguard are among the top five
shareholders of almost 70 percent of the largest 2,000 publicly traded firms in the US; twenty years
ago that number was zero percent for both firms. As a result of such common ownership links,
ownership-adjusted levels of market concentration are frequently twice as large than traditional
concentration indexes that counterfactually assume completely separate ownership.
We then test the model’s qualitative predictions.4 First, we run panel regressions of execu-
tive pay on the firm’s performance, rival firms’ performance, a measure of market concentration
(HHI), the common ownership density of the industry (MHHID), and interactions of profit and
concentration variables. We find that higher levels of common ownership are associated with (i)
lower pay-for-own-performance sensitivity, (ii) higher pay-for-rival-performance sensitivity, and
(iii) higher unconditional CEO pay. These relationships are identified from variation in the time
series and in the cross section: managers in more commonly owned industries receive more pay
for industry performance and less for their own firm’s performance, and when a given industry
becomes more commonly owned, its managers receive less pay for own and more for their rivals’
performance.
Importantly, these results are remarkably robust to various alternative industry definitions
(Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, 2016). Moreover, the pay-performance sensitivity also decreases with
4Our model serves to build intuition, and to clarify the difference in mechanics to the case of managerial
incentives under imperfect competition but separate ownership studied by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a). It is,
however, not a structural model.
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common ownership when pay is measured to include accumulated stock and option compensation
as proposed by Edmans et al. (2012). Importantly, the results are also robust to the measure of
common ownership density we use. In particular, we know the potential endogeneity of market
shares is not driving the results, because similar results obtain with market-share-free measures
of common ownership.
To strengthen a causal interpretation of the link between common ownership concentration and
top management incentives that discourage aggressive competition, we use plausibly exogenous
variation in ownership from the mutual fund trading scandal exploited previously by Anton and
Polk (2014).5 The results corroborate the findings from the panel regressions: executives are less
incentivized to compete aggressively when the industry becomes more commonly owned.
We therefore argue for the likely existence of a causal effect of common ownership on the struc-
ture of incentive contracts. Although we also provided anecdotal evidence that large shareholders
put much effort and thought into questions of executive compensation, our empirical analysis does
not prove that observed compensation structures are the result of a conscious effort on behalf of
asset managers to solve a maximization problem similar to the one we propose in the theoretical
part of the paper. As elsewhere in economics, the “as-if” theory merely helps us understand the
empirical patterns. In particular, our results are consistent with the benign interpretation that
large mutual funds are “lazy owners” (Economist, 2015) that do nothing, except crowding out
or voting against activist investors who would otherwise implement more relative performance
evaluation and lower unconditional pay. Schmalz (2015) discusses a potential occurrence of such
an event. Having lazy owners may simply allow management to live a quiet life (Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2003) with flat incentives, high profit margins, and little competition. Our paper
does not attempt to distinguish between a causal effect of large diversified mutual funds being the
largest owners, or its flip side – an effect of undiversified investors not being the largest owners.
5Ownership structures are endogenously determined in general (Bolton et al., 1998), can depend on the stock
price (Bolton et al., 2006), and could be endogenous to how product market competition relates to the features
of managerial contracts we study. Using quasi-exogenous variation of ownership mitigates concerns that such
endogeneities drive our main results.
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Such a difference in interpretation does not affect the debate over whether there is a causal ef-
fect of large shareholders being common owners on managerial incentives, nor does it affect most
policy implications. The conclusion section provides ideas on how regulators could potentially
distinguish between these interpretations, along with a discussion of broader implications of our
findings for financial economics.
II Model and Hypothesis Development
A Setup
Consider the following stylized model of product market competition and managerial contracts
in which we analyze the role of common ownership. Our model builds on the setup of Aggarwal
and Samwick (1999a). The main differences is that we extend their model to allow for common
ownership.
A1 Product Market Competition
Two firms, labeled 1 and 2, engage in differentiated Cournot (Bertrand) competition. The
model has two stages. At stage 1, the owners (she) of the firms write contracts with the managers
(he), and at stage 2, the managers engage in differentiated Cournot (Bertrand) competition.
We assume that a manager’s action choice at stage 2 is noncontractible. However, profits are
contractible. The two firms face symmetric inverse demand functions given by
Pi(qi, qj) =A− bqi − aqj, (1)
where i, j ∈ 1, 2 and b > a > 0. Thus, the manager’s action choice has a greater impact on the
demand for his own product than does his rival’s action.6
6Although we assume linear demands and two firms, the results of our model generalize to nonlinear demand
functions and industries with more than two firms.
6
The firms have symmetric marginal costs c and the profits of firm i are therefore given by
πi =qi(A− bqi − aqj − c). (2)
A2 Managers
Two risk-neutral managers, 1 and 2, set the quantity (price) for their respective firm. Following
the literature, and in particular Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a), we assume that the following
linear contract is offered to the manager of firm i:
wi = ki + αiπi + βiπj. (3)
We assume that the majority owner of firm i chooses the contract for manager i. The contract is
then revealed to both managers, and the managers choose quantities (prices). In this setup αi is
the incentive slope on own firm profits, βi is the incentive slope on rival firm profits (RPE), and
ki is the fixed payment used to satisfy the individual rationality constraint which is pinned down
by the manager’s outside option w′i.




αi(qi − c)(A− bqi − aqj) + βi(qj − c)(A− bqj − aqi) (4)
max
pi
αi(pi − c)(B − dpi + epj) + βi(pj − c)(A− dpj + epi), (5)
where the coefficients for Bertrand competition are
B = A
b+ a, d =
b
(b+ a)(b− a) , e =
a
(b+ a)(b− a) . (6)
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and hence the optimal quantity (price) choices are
q∗i =
αj(A− c)(αia− 2αib+ βia)
−4αjb2αi + αia2βj + αia2αj + βia2βj + βia2αj
(9)
p∗i =
−αjB(αia+ 2dαi + βie)− αjdc(2dαi + αie− βie) + e2cβj(αi + βi)
−4αid2αj + αie2αj + αie2βj + βie2αj + βie2βj
. (10)
First, note that if β1 = β2 = 0, we obtain the standard differentiated Cournot (Bertrand)
equilibrium for any αi > 0. This is because without any RPE each manager just maximizes
his own firm’s profits the way an undiversified owner-manager would. Second, for the manager’s
action choice, only the relative magnitude (or “compensation ratio”) of αi and βi matters because
no effort incentive problem exists and the base pay ki perfectly offsets any profit-based payments.
Thus, a continuum of optimal contracts exists for each firm’s manager which is only pinned down
by the ratio αi
βi
. In this model, RPE exists purely for strategic reasons. RPE produces no gain due
to better signal extraction from correlated noise shocks because no hidden action problem and risk
aversion exist. However, in section C, we extend our model to allow for RPE due to managerial
risk aversion. Finally, wi is irrelevant in the maximization problem because without risk aversion
and a binding individual rationality constraint, no welfare loss results from imposing risk on the
agent.
A3 Owners
There are two owners, A and B. To simplify the exposition, we assume that they are symmetric
such that A owns a share x ≥ 1/2 of firm 1 and 1 − x of firm 2 and B owns 1 − x of firm 1 and
x of firm 2. Each majority owner sets an incentive contract (ki, αi, βi) for her manager i such
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that it maximizes the profit shares of the owner at both firms. That is, the incentive contract for
manager i internalizes the effect on profits of firm j to the extent that the majority owner of firm




x(πi − wi) + (1− x)(πj − wj) (11)
subject to wi ≥ w
′
i and q∗i ∈ arg max
qi




To build intuition, consider the extreme cases of completely separate ownership (x = 1) and
equal ownership (x = 1/2).
B1 Separate Ownership (x = 1)




2b+ a < 0 (13)
for any α∗i > 0, whereas under Bertrand competition, they are
β∗i = α∗i
e
2d− e > 0 (14)
for any α∗i > 0 where β∗i < α∗i because d > e.
Thus, under completely separate ownership, owners optimally set managerial incentives in
such a way that they punish (reward) the manager of their firm for the profits of the other
firm. As noted above, this form of RPE is entirely the result of the owners’ strategic product
market considerations. As is common in models of industrial organization, these considerations
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lead to diametrically opposed results under Cournot and Bertrand competition. With strategic
complements, the firms’ reaction functions are upward-sloping, and hence a price increase by one
firm is met by a price increase by the other firm. As a result, each owner prefers its manager not to
compete too aggressively with the other firm, and the best way to induce this is by setting β∗i > 0.
This incentive scheme induces the manager to set high prices because lower prices would hurt
the other firm’s profits. On the other hand, with strategic substitutes, the situation is reversed
and each owner optimally sets β∗i < 0 to punish her manager for the profits earned by the other
firm. It is also easy to show that relative to incentive contracts without RPE (i.e., βi = 0),
equilibrium profits are lower (higher) with RPE under Cournot (Bertrand) competition because
of these strategic substitutes (complements).
B2 Perfectly Common Ownership (x = 1/2)
Under equal ownership (x = 1/2), the equilibrium incentives are
β∗i = α∗i > 0 (15)
for any α∗i > 0 under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Thus, with perfectly common
ownership, we obtain the same monopoly equilibrium for both forms of competition because in
equilibrium, the owners will design managerial incentives that place equal weight on own and rival
profits.
B3 Statement of the Central Result
Comparing the incentive slope on profits of the rival firm β∗i in the two extreme cases of
ownership, it is easy to see that β∗i increases under both forms of competition when moving to
perfectly common ownership. Under Bertrand competition, it increases from α∗i e2d−e < α
∗
i to α∗i ,
whereas under Cournot competition, it increases from −α∗i a2b+a < α
∗
i to α∗i . Thus, the sign of the
change in β∗i is always positive, and hence we have an unambiguous prediction for how common
10
ownership should change managerial incentives.7 Our prediction also holds for all intermediate
cases of ownership (1/2 < x < 1). In particular, the optimal incentives as a function of product










e2 + 4ed(2− 3x) + 4d2x2
2e(1− x) α
∗. (17)
The following proposition establishes our main theoretical result.
Proposition 1. Under both forms of competition, the optimal inverse compensation ratio β∗
α∗
is
increasing in 1− x for 1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. As 1−x increases, that is, as common ownership
increases, each owner cares relatively more about the profits of the other firm in the industry. Thus,
each owner would prefer softer competition between the two firms that she owns. As a result, she
sets incentives for the manager of her majority-owned firm to induce less competitive strategic
behavior. She does so by increasing βi or decreasing αi. Note further that the value of x has
no impact on the product market shares and the HHI because the underlying cost and demand
structures remain unchanged. However, common ownership changes with the value x and it attains
its maximum at x = 1/2. Accordingly, in our empirical tests, we will hold market shares constant
and vary only the degree of common ownership.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that our result unambiguously holds independent of the
form of competition which tends to be the exception in models of strategic product market interac-
tion.8 Regardless of whether the action variable has strategic substitutability or complementarity
(i.e., the two firms are not completely separate monopolists, a > 0) common ownership always
7Note, however, that the magnitude of this change in incentives is larger under Cournot than under Bertrand
competition.
8For example, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) show that the predicted effect on executive compensation of their
main variable of interest switches signs when competition changes from Cournot to Bertrand.
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increases the inverse compensation ratio. Thus, only the combination of common ownership and
any form of strategic interaction is crucial to the existence of an effect on managerial incentives.
C Model Extensions and Generalizations
Our baseline model abstracts from managerial risk aversion and moral hazard problems that
potentially exist between the owners and managers. In doing so we follow the modeling choices
adopted in Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a).
However, in the appendix, we also present two additional closely related contracting models that
also incorporate managerial effort choice amid disutility of effort, risk aversion, and a common
shock to firm profits.9 Most importantly, in both models, our central prediction that common
ownership increases the inverse compensation ratio β∗
α∗
remains unchanged. Moreover, the two
models generate two additional empirical predictions.
First, we study a multi-tasking model in the spirit of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) in which
the manager of firm i can enhance the profits of his own firm as well as influence (e.g., through
competitive investments) the profits of the rival firm. In addition to making the same prediction
about the effect of common ownership on the optimal inverse compensation ratio β∗
α∗
, the model also
separately ties down the optimal levels of the incentive slopes α∗ and β∗. In particular, it predicts
that α∗ is decreasing and β∗ is increasing in the degree of common ownership. (Our baseline model
predicts only the composite effect on the ratio of the incentive slopes while remaining silent about
the separate components.) The following proposition states these claims more formally:
Proposition 2. The optimal incentive slope on own profits α∗ is decreasing and the optimal
incentive slope on rival profits β∗ is increasing in 1− x for 1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Proof. See appendix.
Second, in both the multi-tasking model as well as our baseline product market competition
9All of our analysis is also robust to a change in assumptions such that the manager of each firm derives private
benefits from maximizing his own firm’s profits. These private benefits could arise from managerial perks or career
concerns. However, they neither change the predictions of our baseline model nor those of our extended models.
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model (augmented by managerial effort, disutility of effort, risk aversion, and a common shock),
an increase in common ownership increases the level of base pay k∗. Note that, as before, these
predictions hold market shares constant; we will do the same in the empirical implementation.
Proposition 3. The optimal base pay k∗ is increasing in 1− x if the impact on rival-firm profits
and managerial risk aversion are sufficiently high.
Proof. See appendix.
In other words, unconditional base pay increases in the degree of common ownership. The
intuition is as follows. In both of these models with risk aversion and a common shock, the owner
trades off two conflicting aims of RPE: providing risk insurance from the common shock to the
manager and incentivizing managerial choices that affect the rival firm. If the manager has no
influence on the profits of the other firm (e.g., very high product differentiation and hence separate
monopolies), then the second consideration is absent. Hence, it is always optimal for the owner to
use strong RPE by setting β∗ = −α∗, thereby completely filtering out all the common noise in the
firm’s profits and providing perfect insurance to the manager. However, if the manager’s actions
also affect the rival firm, setting β∗ = −α∗ will no longer be optimal because such incentives would
lead to excessively competitive behavior (e.g., low prices) on behalf of the manager. However, an
incentive scheme where β∗ > −α∗ exposes the risk-averse manager to some compensation risk.
Given that the manager is risk-averse, meeting his outside option now requires paying a higher
base wage. We now take these predictions to the data.
III Data
The model yields testable implications for the relationship between common ownership and
the pay-performance sensitivity in executive compensation at the industry level. To test these
predictions, we need measures of executive compensation, performance data, data on ownership,
and a robust industry definition. In what follows, we first describe how common ownership is
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measured and then detail the data sources used to construct our variables.
A Measuring Common Ownership
This paper aims to answer to which extent common ownership concentration in an industry
affects managerial incentives. To that end, we need to measure common ownership concentration.
This endeavor is substantially more complicated in the empirical analysis than in theory, because
there are typically more than two firms in an industry, and that different types of shareholders
exist that hold a variety of different portfolios. Fortunately, the existing literature provides a
candidate measure of common ownership concentration that stands up to these challenges.
We measure common ownership concentration with the MHHI delta (henceforth MHHID),
proposed by O’Brien and Salop (2000), and previously implemented empirically by Azar et al.
(2015). The approach assumes that firms maximize a weighted sum of the portfolio profits accruing
to their shareholders. (A special case is the maximization of the own firms value; this case obtains
when all shareholders have their entire wealth invested in the same firm.) Formally, the objective










where γij is the control share of firm j held by owner i, and βij is the ownership share of firm j
accruing to investor i. Note that this objective is proportional to the sum of the firm’s own profits,
plus the profits of the other firms in the industry – to the extent that these rivals are owned by








Using the resulting objective function in a Cournot model yields the prediction that industry
markups are proportional to a modified HHI index of market concentration, MHHI. Note that
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the special case of separate ownership predicts MHHI = HHI as a valid measure of market
concentration.










where sj is the market share of firm j, and the final terms on the right hand side is the common
ownership concentration in the industry, which we abbreviate MHHID. Note that MHHID
closely corresponds to the objective function of the firm reflected in Equation (19). Therefore, the
question whether common ownership concentration in an industry relates to managerial incentives
is potentially informative about the objective function of the firm.
B Data Description
Executive Compensation. ExecuComp provides annual panel compensation data for the
top five executives of S&P1500 plus 500 additional public firms. The data includes details about
compensation, tenure, and position. Summary statistics about pay level, standard deviation, and
distribution are given in Table 1 Panel A. Total compensation (TDC1) includes salary, bonus,
stock and option grants, and any other payouts. The average (median) yearly compensation of an
executive in our sample is $2.31m ($1.36m) and average (median) tenure is 4.6 (3) years.
Firm Performance. Following Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a), we measure firm performance
as the firm’s increase in market value (lagged market value multiplied by stock return), and
rival performance as the value-weighted return of all firms in the industry excluding the firm
in question, multiplied by the firm’s last-period market value. This measure has at least two
advantages in addition to comparability to the literature. One is that market values are what
matters to shareholders. Second, when markets are reasonably efficient, market values are more
informative than accounting profits. Table 1 Panel A reports summary statistics about own and
rival performance, sales, and volatility.
Ownership. To construct the ownership variables, we use Thompson Reuters 13Fs, which
are taken from regulatory filings of institutional owners. We describe the precise construction
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of the common ownership variables in the following section. A limitation implied by this data
source is that we do not observe holdings of individual owners. We assume that these stakes are
relatively small and in most cases don’t directly exert a significant influence on firm management.
Inspection of proxy statements of all firms in particular industries, as performed by the previous
literature (Azar et al., 2015, 2016), suggests that the stakes individual shareholders own in large
publicly traded firms are rarely significant enough to substantially alter the measure of common
ownership concentration we use, even in the most extreme cases. For example, even Bill Gates’s
ownership of about 5% of Microsoft’s stock is small compared to the holdings of more than 23%
of the top five institutional owners. Common ownership is mainly determined by the latter, and
including or discarding the information on Bill Gates has little effect on the measure of common
ownership used. We thus expect that the arising inaccuracies introduce measurement noise and a
bias toward zero in our regressions.10 Common ownership summary statistics are discussed below.
Variation over time within and across industries in common ownership comes from any variation
in the structure of the ownership network, i.e., from any change in top shareholder positions. These
changes include transactions in which an actively managed fund increases or offloads a position
in an individual stock, as well as transactions in which an index fund increases its holdings across
a broad set of firms because of inflows the fund needs to invest. It also includes variation from
combinations of asset managers. Some of this variation could be thought of being endogenous
to executive incentives. For example, an undiversified investor might accumulate a position in
a single firm that has an inefficiently structured compensation policy in place, thus decreasing
common ownership density, which would be followed by a change in compensation structure. Or,
an investor might buy shares from undiversified investors and accumulate positions in competing
firms, thus increasing common ownership density, with the aim of decreasing competition between
them.11
10We are not aware of a publicly available data set that provides more accurate information on ownership for
both institutions and individuals than the one we use. For example, we determined by manual inspection that
ownership information provided by alternative data sources that contains individual owners (e.g., Osiris) is often
inaccurate; we hence prefer regulatory data from the SEC.
11See Flaherty and Kerber (2016) for an example and a brief discussion of potential legal consequences.
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Industry Definitions. Regarding the definition of markets and industries, we again start
with the benchmark provided by the existing corporate finance literature (i.e., Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999a)), and then offer several refinements. Our baseline specifications define industries
by four-digit SIC codes. Compustat North America provides sales, with which we construct the
industry-year level HHI indices based on sales. For robustness, we also use the coarser three-digit
SIC codes. The advantage of doing so is that broader industry definitions may be more appropriate
for multi-segment firms. Two significant disadvantages are that the market definition necessarily
becomes less detailed, and that the variation used decreases. We then provide robustness checks
using the arguably more precise, 10K-text-based industry classifications of Hoberg and Phillips
(2010, 2016) (HP). Albuquerque (2009) shows that splitting industries in size groups makes finding
relative performance evaluation (RPE) easier in the data. Hence, not size-splitting industries
could lead to false positive support for our explanation, which disfavors RPE. Therefore, to be
conservative from the perspective of finding support for our explanation, we also provide results
that size-split industries, both defined by SIC codes and HP.
Despite our efforts at pushing the incentive literature’s boundary on industry definitions, none
of the industry definitions we employ is perfect. In general, the assumption that an industry
corresponds to a market in a way that precisely maps to theory deviates from reality, no matter
whether CRSP-SIC or HP classifications are used. Moreover, using Compustat to extract sales
and compute market shares implies we miss private firms in our sample. Studies that focus on
one industry alone and benefit from specialized data sets for that purpose can avoid or mitigate
these shortcomings. However, for firm-level cross-industry studies, the imperfection implied by
coarser industry definitions is unavoidable. Available data sets on ownership and industries also
limit existing studies to public firms.
C Common Ownership Across Industries and Over Time
Our sample goes from 1993 to 2014. Table 1 Panel A provides summary statistics for HHI and
MHHID at the four-digit SIC code industry level over these years. In the average and median
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industry, ownership concentration is about a quarter as large as product market concentration.
However, these economy-wide summary statistics partly obscure the variation in both product
market and ownership concentration across different sectors of the economy and over time. Panel
B reports the same measures of HHI and MHHID, but separately for each two-digit SIC code
sector. More precisely, the concentration measures are computed for each four-digit industry and
then averaged across these industries, for each two-digit code.
The variation in ownership concentration is not limited to the cross-section. Figure I shows
that the increase in MHHID for the average four-digit SIC code industry in various sectors has been
significant over the past two decades. In particular, in construction, manufacturing, finance, and
services the average industry MHHID has increased by more 600 HHI points. While this number
is a lower bound due to the coarse industry definitions we use, it is already three times larger
than the 200-point threshold the DoJ/FTC horizontal merger guidelines find “likely to enhance
market power.” This increase in ownership concentration is largely decoupled from a relatively
constant product market concentration. As an example, Figure II shows the average HHI and
MHHID time series for the manufacturing sector where the average is taken across four-digit SIC
code industry definitions. Indeed, Manufacturing and finance saw particularly large increases in
ownership concentration while product market concentration remained essentially flat.
Figure II also illustrates that common ownership concentration MHHID can add a quanti-
tatively large amount of concentration to standard measures of industry concentration HHI. At
the end of our sample, in 2013, MHHI is more than 1,500 points higher than HHI. Again, these
magnitudes are likely underestimates of the true extent of increased market concentration. Even
larger magnitudes have been reported with more precise market-level concentration measures in
the airlines and banking industry by Azar et al. (2015, 2016).
Where does this ownership concentration come from? Table 3 shows that large mutual fund
companies play an important role. Panel A reports the number and fraction of firms for which a
particular investor is the largest shareholder of the firm, by two-digit industry. Panel B repeats
the exercise, but instead reports the proportion of firms for which a particular investor is among
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the top ten shareholders of the firm. Although the two panels reveal a significant amount of
sectoral variation in ownership concentration even the overall magnitude of common ownership is
quite large across the entire sample of firms. For example, BlackRock is now among the largest
ten shareholders of almost 70% of all the firms in our sample, that is, roughly the 2,000 largest
publicly traded firms in the U.S.. Vanguard follows very close behind.
Although the industry cross-section of ownership concentration already speaks to the important
role that large mutual funds play, the time series is perhaps even more instructive. Panel C shows
that the role of these investors has become more important over the last two decades. Whereas a
very small proportion of firms had one of the investors listed in the panel as one of their top ten
shareholders at the beginning of our sample, a very large proportion did so at the end. For example,
both BlackRock and Vanguard were among the top ten shareholders in almost no firms, they were
among the top ten in almost 70 percent of the sample firms in the final years of our sample. To
put that number in perspective, recall that our sample includes quite small corporations outside
the S&P1,500 as well, for which large asset managers typically don’t hold large blocks of shares.
IV Panel Regressions
This section details how we translate the stylized model’s predictions into empirically testable
hypotheses.
A Empirical methodology
We want to test how own-performance compensation and relative performance evaluation are
affected by common ownership under imperfect competition. A basic equation that allows us to
define pay-for-performance sensitivity and the sensitivity of pay to rival firms’ performance is
ωij = kij + αijπoj + βijπrj + εij, (21)
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where manager i works in firm j, and superscript o refers to own firm perfomance, and r refers
to rivals’ firm performance. αij is the pay-for-performance sensitivity, and βij is the sensitivity of
manager i’s pay ωij to firm j’s rivals’ performance.
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) are interested in the question how αij and βij depend on
product market concentration. They hence extend this equation to
ωij = ki + α1πoj + α2πojF (HHIj) +
+β1πrj + β2πrjtF (HHIj) +
+γ1F (HHIj) + γ3CEOij + εij, (22)
where F (HHI) is the industry’s concentration rank, and take a particular interest in the coeffi-
cients α2 and β2. By contrast, the present paper investigates if common ownership concentration
(MHHID), obtained from the generalized measure of market concentration MHHI introduced
above, has a significant effect on the incentive slopes α and β, respectively. Moreover, we employ
panel regressions, i.e., use both cross-sectional and time-series variation. We hence further extend
the equation,
ωijt = ki + α1πojt + α2πojtF (HHIjt) + α3πojtF (MHHIDjt) +
+β1πrjt + β2πrjtF (HHIjt) + β3πrjtF (MHHIDjt) +
+γ1F (HHIjt) + γ2F (MHHIDjt) + γ3CEOijt + εijt (23)
where our interest is chiefly in the coefficients α3 and β3 to test Proposition 1, and in coefficient
γ2 to test Proposition 2.
In addition, following the literature, we control for firm size (Rosen, 1982), CEO tenure
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001b), and stock return volatility as a proxy for operating risk
(Core and Guay, 2003; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999b). Also, time and industry fixed effects are
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included in all specifications. The use of time fixed effects is to mitigate the following concern:
both common ownership and executive pay have increased over time, but so have a large number
of other unmeasured variables. The concern is that the true driver of executive pay and common
ownership is such an omitted variable. Time fixed effects difference out the effect of such a variable,
making use only of the changes in the cross-sectional variation over time. Time fixed effects do
not rule out, however, that a heterogeneous increase in executive pay across industries, which also
experienced a differential increase in common ownership, is driven by a heterogeneous exposure to
an omitted variable. We attempt to attenuate that concern with an instrumental variables (IV)
strategy in the next section.
Industry fixed effects are included to rule out that an omitted variable that is correlated both
with the cross-sectional distribution of MHHID and with the level of executive pay drives the
results. A specification that includes industry fixed effects identifies the effect of MHHID on pay
from variation over time in both pay and MHHID. A first concern is that the omitted variable
that drives both MHHID and pay evolved in endogenous ways over time. But that explanation
is ruled out by the inclusion of time fixed effects, explained above. We discuss further endogeneity
concerns below.
We are interested specifically in testing whether the ratio β/α from the theory is increasing in




= α = α1 + α2F (HHIjt) + α3F (MHHIDjt) (24)
∂ωij
∂πrj
= β = β1 + β2F (HHIjt) + β3F (MHHIDjt).
The final step is to differentiate the ratio β/α with respect to the c.d.f. of MHHID to be able to
test Proposition 1:
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S = ∂ (β/α)
∂F (MHHID) =
(α1β3 − α3β1) + (α2β3 − α3β2) ∗ F (HHI)
(α1 + α2F (HHI) + α3F (MHHID))2
. (25)
Proposition 1 predicts that under both Cournot (strategic substitutes) and Bertrand (strategic
complements) models of competition, S > 0. We test this hypothesis at the median value of the
c.d.f.’s, i.e.: F (HHI) = 0.5 and F (MHHID) = 0.5.
In agreement with the literature (Albuquerque, 2009; Frydman and Saks, 2010; Custódio et
al., 2013), all regressions are clustered at the firm level.
B Panel Regression Results
Table 4 presents the main results. We start with a benchmark result. Column (1) presents a
regression corresponding to Equation (22) of executive pay on the explanatory variables perfor-
mance of own and rival firm, and those variables interacted with market concentration (HHI). It
most closely corresponds to the regressions in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) and do not include a
common ownership measure. (Given our vastly differing sample (they: 1992-1993, we: 1993-2014),
the use of time and industry fixed effects in our case, and the differences in the breadth of the
sample (they: manufacturing, we: all industries), the results are not expected to be compara-
ble.) The highly significant and positive coefficient (0.137) on Own [firm’s performance] indicates
that executives take home more pay when their firm performs better. In other words, the “pay-
performance sensitivity” is positive. This effect is stronger in more concentrated industries (higher
HHI). HHI itself has no significant correlation with executive pay. The positive coefficient on
Rival [firms’ performance] indicates a lack of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in industries
at the very bottom of the HHI distribution. The highly significant Rival ∗ HHI coefficient in-
dicates that contracts come closer to the RPE prediction when an industry’s HHI rank is higher
or increases.
These result experience a striking reinterpretation once the HHI measure of market con-
centration is complemented with the MHHID measure of common ownership concentration,
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corresponding to Equation (23). Recall that under the O’Brien and Salop (2000) theory, the
empirically relevant concentration measure MHHI is the sum of MHHID and HHI. Hence,
omitting MHHID from a regression can lead to bias; a change of coefficients on HHI can there-
fore be expected once MHHID and its interactions with performance are introduced. That is
indeed what we find.
Column (2) shows that the comparative statics of pay-performance sensitivity and pay-for-
rival-performance sensitivity with respect to HHI are no longer present in the data. Instead, the
formerly insignificantHHI coefficient turns highly significantly positive, indicating that executives
in more concentrated industries take home higher salaries. The pay-performance and pay-for-rival-
performance sensitivities themselves remain stable. However, those coefficients are not robust to
the inclusion of controls, as columns (3) to (5) show.
The first key result is in the first three rows of column (2): the pay-for-performance sensitivity
decreases, the pay-for-rival-performance increases, and unconditional pay increases when common
ownership concentration (MHHID) increases. The formal test of the main theoretical prediction
and its empirical analogue (Equation (25)) is given in Panel B: the inverse compensation ratio
increases with the level of MHHID. The probability of a false positive is lower than 0.6 percent.
Column (3) includes standard controls. The pay-for-rival-performance sensitivity becomes
statistically indistinguishable from zero, but the main result that relative performance evaluation
decreases with common ownership is unaffected. The result that unconditional executive pay
increases retains a positive point estimate but loses statistical significance.
Columns (4) and (5) reveal why this is the case: common ownership increases unconditional
CEO pay, but not the unconditional pay for non-CEO top managers. But for both CEOs and
non-CEO executives, the use of relative performance evaluation decreases with common ownership.
The formal compensation ratio tests confirm the model prediction at the 1 percent confidence level,
with the exception of the CEO subsample, where confidence drops to the 5 percent level. Of course,
the drop in significance is not surprising given that only about a sixth of the sample consists of
CEOs.
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The above results used CRSP 4-digit SIC codes as the industry definition. Previous research
has shown great sensitivity of RPE tests (and many other corporate finance relationships) to in-
dustry definitions. We are therefore interested in examining how the correlations between common
ownership and pay structure depends on alternative industry definitions.
Table 5 examines the robustness of our results to different industry definitions. The first
column replicates specification (3) from Table 4 with full controls for comparison. Column (2)
refines the definition of the rival group as the size tertile within the 4-digit SIC code, inspired
by Albuquerque (2009) and as discussed above. The only significant difference of interest is that
the MHHID coefficient becomes highly significant, indicating that the average executive takes
home more pay that is unrelated to performance when we refine the industry definition. This
fact raises our confidence about the validity of the prediction: attenuation bias could explain the
lower significance levels in the previous specifications that use coarser, and thus presumably less
accurate, industry definitions.
These results also alleviate a further concern. One might reasonably hypothesize that there is
greater measurement error with respect to a correct industry classification for larger firms, because
those are more likely to operate in multiple segments. At the same time, common ownership is
partially driven by index funds and could therefore have a correlation with firm size. Also, CEO
pay tends to increase in firm size. Taken together, these considerations might lead to a worry
about a bias in the MHHID by an imperfect size control. (A concern about the pay-for-(rival-
)performance coefficients could be constructed similarly, although it would require additional levels
of joint correlations.) Given that the results become stronger, not weaker, when tests are explicitly
run within size groups, that concern is greatly attenuated.
Columns (3) and (4) use the Hoberg and Phillips (2010) (HP) industry definition, first as is and
then with the size split refinement. The coefficient on rival-firm performance becomes statistically
insignificant in both cases. The compensation ratio test loses significance (but retains its sign)
in column (3) but regains a one percent level of statistical significance when the finer industry
definition is used.
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We find this result remarkable for two reasons. One is, as previously explained, that Albu-
querque (2009) shows that relative performance evaluation becomes more prevalent with size splits,
which should work against finding support for our model. However, the results in the literature
of course omit MHHID. Once common ownership is included, consistent with the interpretation
that size splits increase the accuracy of industry definitions, the statistical significance of the re-
sults confirming the model predictions increases. The second reason is that the results, by contrast
to some in the literature, are robust across SIC and HP definitions.
A last set of industry definitions goes in the opposite direction as size-splits and uses coarser
definitions instead. The intuitive motivation is that many firms operate and compete in multiple
segments. A coarser industry classification may decrease the probability that a firm’s industry
is inappropriately classified. An alternative interpretation, more consistent with the industrial
organization literature, would be more akin to a placebo test: coarser industry classifications are
necessarily less precise. Columns (5) and (6) report such results for SIC and HP classifications,
respectively. The point estimates are the same, but significance levels in general are lower. We
interpret the results as more consistent with the interpretation that coarser industry definitions
are less precise, rather than they improve accuracy by avoiding misclassifications.
C Robustness to the Measures of Pay and Common Ownership
Table 5 varied industry classifications. We next vary the measure of pay used as the outcome
variable. “Flow” take home salary (tdc1 in Execucomp) for most executives is only a part of
their total compensation. Stock and option grants are another, often very large, component.
If there was a systematic correlation between the fraction of pay given as salary versus stock
and options and the interaction between MHHID and pay-for-(rival-)performance, the previous
results might be biased, perhaps to an extent of giving qualitatively wrong information. While
we have no particular reason in mind why that would be the case, it is clearly important whether
this consideration has a major impact on our results.
To that end, in Appendix Table I, we use the Edmans et al. (2012) various measures of wealth-
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performance sensitivity as the dependent variable, and examine how it depends on MHHID,
controlling for HHI and size (as in said paper). The point estimate of the coefficient varies
with the specification and measure used, but the qualitative direction is very robust: the wealth-
performance sensitivity is lower in industries with more common ownership. Because it is not
clear how to reasonably construct a wealth-rival-performance measure (given the unobservability
of executives entire portfolios), we cannot test whether the sensitivity of executive wealth to rival
firms’ performance also moves in the expected direction. We leave such an attempt to future
research.
So far we have shown robustness of the main results to alternative industry definitions, and
to alternative measures of pay. The last major category of robustness checks is with respect
to the measure of common ownership. Whereas MHHID is the most realistic measure we are
aware of in the literature, it comes with assumptions, which may not hold in practice. One
important assumption is that it takes market shares to be exogenous. At first sight, it may
seem paradoxical to use a measure of competition that takes market shares to be exogenous:
competitive strategies will affect market shares. Upon inspection, however, doing so should not
lead to a concern about false positive findings. The theory on which the MHHID is based,
reviewed briefly above, predicts a positive effect of MHHID on price-cost margins, and market
shares positively enter the MHHID. If a firm raised prices, it should lose market share, leading
to lower MHHID. Hence, the endogeneity of market shares works against the predictions of the
common ownership model.
Nevertheless, we want to inspect in how far our main results depend on this measure of common
ownership in this dimension. To that end, in Appendix Table II we run regressions similar to those
in Tables 4 and 5. The difference is that we calculate MHHID assuming that each firm in the
industry has a market share of one divided by the number of firms in the industry.12 We show
these regressions both with and without controls, and for both SIC and HP industry definitions.
Moreover, we use the most detailed industry measure (size splits similar to Albuquerque (2009)),
12We are grateful to Daniel Ferreira for suggesting that measure.
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which the existing literature has shown to be most conductive to finding evidence for relative
performance evaluation (i.e., the opposite of what the alternative theory we propose predicts).
Let us first examine what we should expect to see under the different hypotheses. Under the
null hypothesis that the O’Brien and Salop (2000) model is correct, equal-weighting makes for
a less precise but directionally correct measure of common ownership, which should attenuate
coefficients. The reason for the expected attenuation is that a measure of common ownership that
assigns equal market shares to all firms fails to distinguish between the following two situations.
In both cases, there are three firms: A, B, and C. A and B have 45% market share, and C has 10%.
If there is perfect common ownership between A and B, the industry is practically monopolized.
If there is common ownership between A and C and B or C, by contrast, common ownership is
not very important in the industry. The variation across these two scenarios in the importance
of common ownership is entirely ignored by a measure of common ownership concentration that
ignores market shares altogether. In contrast, under the hypothesis that the standard model is
right, and all our results are driven by the endogenous nature of market shares, the test should
produce pure noise.
The coefficients in Appendix Table II indicate that the potential endogeneity of market shares
is not the main driver of the results. All coefficients of interest retain their direction, albeit some
drop a level of significance. The compensation ratio test is significant at least at 3 percent levels.
These results are inconsistent with the notion that the way in which market shares are endogenous
entirely drive the results, and that a market-share free measure of common ownership would lead
to opposite conclusions.
D Remaining Concerns
A first worry we entertained is that sorting of executives with particular characteristics could
be driving and thus invalidate the results. For example, less aggressive CEOs might sort into
firms that are more held by index funds and that (for an unexplained reason) also happen to offer
“flatter” compensation packages. We think this story is potentially realistic. The conclusions are
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however unaffected: the purpose of the paper is to show that in firms whose largest owners are
widely diversified, managers “get away” with flatter pay structures because there are no powerful
shareholders in whose interest it is to change anything about it. Given this is indeed part of the
story we propose, we do not intend to challenge such a sorting hypothesis.
Relatedly, one might suspect that a mechanical relationship exists between executive pay and
stock performance, and that there is also a mechanical relationship between stock performance and
measures of common ownership concentration such as the MHHID. One would suspect that this
mechanics plays a greater role for the “stock” pay measure we use in the robustness checks than for
the “flow pay” used in the baseline specifications. However, this should not be a concern in either
case. For one, it is not clear why the mechanical relationship should be stronger in industries and
at times with greater common ownership. Much more importantly, however, the whole point of
relative performance evaluation is that such mechanical effects should get differenced out by the
optimal contract. The point of the paper is that shareholders have reduced incentives to do such
differencing in industries with more common ownership.
A relevant remaining concern is, however, that reverse causality is driving these correlations,
or (more likely) that an omitted variable that determines both MHHID and the structure of CEO
pay both in the time series and in the cross section is the true cause for these patterns. The
following section attempts to alleviate such concerns by using variation in ownership that was
caused by a mutual fund trading scandal, and is therefore plausibly exogenous to compensation
contracts.
V IV Strategy and Results
A An Exogenous Change in Common Ownership
The motivating theory of this paper treats common ownership 1− x as an exogenous param-
eter. However, real-world ownership patterns are endogenously determined and could potentially
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be related to top management incentives, be that because of their effect on competition or for
other reasons. As a result, the correlations from the previous section’s panel regression results
cannot necessarily be interpreted causally. Specifically, the correlations could be driven by omitted
variable or reverse causality concerns. This section uses a subset of the variation in ownership,
namely that stemming from a mutual funds scandal which was plausibly exogenous to both com-
pensation contracts and competition. That variation is more difficult to attribute to endogenous
forces. Hence, if changes of ownership that derive from this shock correlate in similar ways with
changes in executive pay levels and structures, the reverse causality and omitted variable concerns
are attenuated.
The instrument, previously employed by Anton and Polk (2014), relies on the mutual fund scan-
dal of 2003, in which funds from 25 mutual fund families were accused of engaging in late trading
and market timing. The affected families included well-known and large firms such as Janus,
Columbia Management Group, Franklin Templeton, etc. The news became public in September
2003. Investors aggressively pulled out money from those families over the following months. Of
course, the capital does not disappear but merely gets reallocated; when one fund sells, another
one buys. Given that outflows as a reaction to the scandal don’t give an immediate reason for
passive funds to buy precisely that stock, it is likely that other active funds bought the stocks
the affected fund families sold to meet their withdrawals. They may or may not have been large
holders of other funds in the industry already. As a result, it is unclear ex ante whether the shock
increased or decreased common ownership. But clearly, the shock led to changes in ownership
networks.
Kisin (2011) first showed that the effect of withdrawals lasted until December 2006, and that
outflows of implicated families amounted to 14% the first year, and over 21% the second year.
Hence, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the shock had a significant effect on ownership struc-
tures, and hence optimal contracts, until about 2006. We test if that hypothesis is correct, and if
there is empirical support for the hypothesis that changes in common ownership density induced
by the shock alone (i.e., not using the actual changes in common ownership) are correlated with
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lower relative performance evaluation and higher unconditional pay.
Formally, the instrument is the fraction of “scandal common ownership” by total common











where in the numerator, ∑i γijβik, we sum only across scandal funds, whereas in the denom-
inator, ∑i γijβij, we sum across all funds. The instrument is the ratio of scandalous common




In addition to instrumenting for MHHID, we also instrument for its interactions with own
performance and rival performance, by multiplying the ratio with own and rival profits. Con-
sequently, we report three first-stage regressions, where dependent variables are F (MHHIDjt),
πojtF (MHHIDjt), and πrjtF (MHHIDjt), each in the years 2004 until 2006. We provide the results
both for SIC and for HP industry classifications, making for six specifications in total. The second
stage will regress CEO pay on the fitted values from the first-stage regression, for the same years
as for the first stage.
The identifying assumption is that the Scandal Ratio in 2003 is not related to how firms were
planning (and going) to set compensation levels and sensitivities in the years to come, and in
particular that the firms in industries with high Scandal Ratios were planning to set flatter pay
schedules.
We can think of a violation of that assumption. For example, the (active and therefore less
diversified) “scandalous” funds could – against their economic interest – have successfully advo-
cated flatter pay structures to their portfolio firms, whereas the impact of such interventions was
only felt with several years of a delay when the ownership structure had changed. We find such a
scenario less likely than the scenario that all shareholders act in their economic interest, including
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the simple idea that diversified “passive” investors may not advocate for steeper pay packages
that hurt their economic interests. In general, violations of the identification assumption are not
unthinkable, but appear to us to be less plausible than the more straightforward explanation that
economic agents act in accordance with their economic incentives.
The results of the first stage regression are in Table 6. The main observation is that there is a
statistically highly significant relationship between the Scandal Ratio and MHHID. Owing to the
different industry definitions, the ratio takes the opposite sign in column (1) than in column (4),
but is likewise highly significant. The Ratio interaction with profits and rival profits is likewise
highly significant. More importantly, the F-statistic in all specifications is higher than 20 in all
specifications.
Results of the second stage regression are in Table 7. We report results for all executives
and for non-CEOs for SIC and HP industry classifications. (Owing to the restriction to only 3
years of data, the sample for CEOs alone is too small for the tests to have statistical power.) The
coefficients on the interaction ofMHHID and own profits are negative, and significant at 5 percent
levels in the SIC specifications. The coefficient on MHHID interacted with rival performance is
positive throughout and marginally significant only in the HP specifications. The crucial statistic
for our hypothesis test is reported in Panel B. Across all specifications, the inverse compensation
ratio is highly statistically significant.
Importantly for the test of the theory’s second main prediction, the effect of MHHID on
the level of executive pay is highly significant and economically large across all specifications,
corroborating the results from the panel analysis.
These results do not rule out, but attenuate, the identification concerns that remained after
the fixed-effects panel regressions. We conclude that it is likely that there is a causal effect of




In this paper, we showed that the combination of large-shareholder diversification and imperfect
competition has a profound impact on the structure of top management incentives. Specifically,
we find that managers receive less pay for own-firm performance and more for rivals’ performance
when the firm’s shareholders own large stakes in said rivals.
We thus illustrated the power of relaxing an important assumption present in most models
in corporate finance: that product markets are perfectly competitive. (The assumption that
shareholders are diversified is more common throughout financial economics.) The traditional
models dismiss the importance of insights from industrial organization for finance perhaps for
a combination of historical reasons and convenience: the assumption that markets are perfectly
competitive affords that even when shareholders are diversified, perhaps to heterogeneous extents,
and thus have anti-competitive economic interests to various extents, we can nevertheless safely
assume that firms maximize their own profits (as opposed to an objective function that also takes
other firms’ profits into account, perhaps determined by a complicated voting procedure or other
mechanisms). After all, competitive strategy is trivial when firms are price takers; there is simply
nothing to strategize or disagree about. This insight is known as the Fisher Separation Theorem
(FST); see Fisher (1930); DeAngelo (1981); Milne (1981) for discussions. Because the FST implies
differences in shareholder preferences are inconsequential, thinking about how they can be resolved
is unnecessary. The FST thus dramatically simplifies thinking about corporate financial decision
making. Perhaps because of the perceived attractiveness of such simplifications, the assumption
of perfect competition – which is necessary for the FST to hold – has been ubiquitous in the
corporate finance literature ever since.13
The theoretical and empirical results in this paper show, however, that assuming that the
FST holds (by assuming away a combination of diversification and market power) can lead to
13There is a literature in corporate finance that focuses on interactions between imperfect competition and
financial strategy, and another literature on imperfect competition and optimal contracts. However, those literatures
tend to assume implicitly that shareholders do not diversify across competitors.
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qualitatively opposing interpretations of empirical facts and of its economic drivers. We find that
the debate regarding which assumptions are appropriate for the literature going forward is an
important one to have. Indeed, by providing evidence consistent with the idea that the FST’s
predictions are not always empirically valid, we attempt to illustrate a great untapped potential
for empirical work in corporate finance that results from relaxing the theorem’s assumptions.
Under the FST, questions such as how shareholder disagreements are resolved, and how these
disagreements affect the objective function and behavior of the firm, are moot. However, these
questions become relevant when researchers recognize the possibility that markets can be less than
perfectly competitive and that shareholders can be diversified across natural competitors at the
same time.
A more pragmatic conclusion of our paper is that we answered a specific research question at the
intersection of finance and industrial organization. The open question was which mechanism can
induce the anti-competitive product market behavior of firms that arises from common ownership
(Azar et al., 2015) and ultimate ownership (the combination of common ownership and cross-
ownership) (Azar et al., 2016). The answer we propose is that managerial incentive contracts can
give managers economic reasons to act in their shareholders’ anti-competitive interests. We also
provided new anecdotal evidence on engagement meetings, voting patterns, and coordination of
corporate governance activities among large previously-perceived-to-be-passive shareholders, and
thus suggest how shareholder preferences enter compensation contracts.
However, we have no hard evidence that allows for a quantitative evaluation of how the con-
tracts whose outcomes we measure are brought about. Perhaps our study will inspire a quantitative
investigation of these practices. Finding direct evidence for the channels would likely require in-
formation about the precise content of engagement meetings. Unfortunately for researchers, these
meetings are designed to be private. Regulatory records that are currently being obtained as part
of a federal antitrust investigation (McLaughlin and Schlangenstein, 2015) may become available
in the future. Given the uncertainty of being presented with such an opportunity, we leave this
and related questions for future research.
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Figure I. Common Ownership Concentration (MHHID) in Various Sectors Over Time.
This figure plots the ownership concentration as measured by MHHID averaged across four-digit SIC code indus-
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Figure II. Four-digit SIC HHI versus MHHI over time in Manufacturing.
This figure plots the product market and ownership concentration in manufacturing industries as measured by
HHI and MHHID averaged across four-digit SIC code industries in manufacturing for the years 1994 to 2013.
45
Tables
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Key Variables.
We report the average and other summary statistics for the variables at the manager level (total compensation and tenure), at the firm
level (performance, size, and volatility), and at the industry level (HHI and MHHI Delta).
Variables N Mean Median Std 10% 90%
At the manager level
TDC1 (Compensation ’000) 223605 2308 1364 2413 411 5967
Tenure (years) 252443 4.6 3 3.7 1 10
At the firm level
Own Performance 39426 521.8 119.8 1693.7 -822 2607.2
Rival Performance (SIC4) 36797 504.3 108.7 1528.1 -639.4 2301.2
Log(Sale) 41760 7.06 6.99 1.66 5.08 9.25
Volatility 38249 0.1218 0.1075 0.0639 0.0598 0.2014
At the industry level (SIC4)
HHI 9340 4814 4674 2942 853 8963
MHHI Delta 9340 1437 1140 1285 94 3203
46
Table 2. Panel A: Cross-sectional Variation of Production Market (HHI) and Common Ownership (MHHI
Delta) Concentration Across and Within industries.
This table reports summary statistics for product market and ownership concentration for the average two-digit SIC industry, whereas
averages are taken across four-digit SIC industries.
HHI MHHI Delta
Main SIC group and Description # of 4-digit # of 4-digit Mean 10% 90% Mean 10% 90%
SIC in 2013 SIC-Years
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 4 214 6882 5314 9955 448 4 1260
10-14 Mining 77 1684 4510 1174 8806 1609 24 3504
15-17 Construction 24 981 4761 1542 8168 1204 60 2719
20-39 Manufacturing 707 23761 5247 2230 8949 1253 53 2932
40-49 Transportation & Public Utilities 152 4184 3826 1028 7211 1797 133 3831
50-51 Wholesale Trade 107 3222 5034 2346 8660 1272 60 2839
52-59 Retail Trade 120 3903 4552 1669 7887 1452 141 3157
60-67 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 168 5241 3817 1017 7908 1520 82 3618
70-89 Services 246 7409 4722 1681 8576 1113 62 2518
Table 2. Panel B: Time-series variation of Production Market (HHI) and Common Ownership (MHHI Delta)
Concentration, by Industry.
This table reports the the variation over time in the conventional HHI measure of product market concentration and the additional
piece to concentration stemming from common ownership, MHHI Delta, in various industries. The concentrations numbers are
averages across four-digit SIC industries, for each two-digit SIC industry group.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing HHI 6945 6858 6370 6198 6842 6543 6134 5802 5808 5620 8048 7991 8462 9972 9491 8011 7747 9961 9987 9991MHHID 393 818 417 139 94 358 1016 926 361 675 47 305 90 0 2 231 604 8 2 0
10-14 Mining HHI 4746 4203 4481 4816 4579 4814 4796 4156 4375 4096 4509 3761 4837 4563 4965 4585 4173 4230 4081 4487MHHID 1227 1920 1706 1418 1307 1241 1764 1502 1703 1933 1533 1066 1460 1404 1700 1578 2224 2047 1981 1899
15-17 Construction HHI 4359 4223 4922 4149 4071 3517 4044 4634 4808 4839 4773 5039 4799 5699 5929 4998 5611 4234 3959 4040MHHID 1103 1299 1158 1080 923 1242 1080 1351 1101 980 1099 1085 856 1131 1449 1206 1655 1998 1847 1763
20-39 Manufacturing HHI 5173 5095 4973 5152 5139 5028 5044 5094 5206 5155 5222 5030 5362 5355 5542 5490 5503 5349 5426 5428MHHID 942 953 1025 953 985 1151 1246 1377 1492 1460 1398 1188 1280 1345 1379 1516 1761 1705 1700 1771
40-49 Transportation & Public Ut. HHI 4298 4503 4152 3803 3643 3557 3399 3246 3388 3482 3795 3754 3470 3881 3802 3760 3714 3893 3967 3868MHHID 1557 1447 1363 1434 1318 1563 1726 1845 2400 2374 1999 1335 1781 1942 1884 2228 2239 2398 2111 2322
50-51 Wholesale Trade HHI 5223 4884 4689 4876 4459 4323 4752 4549 4292 4366 4751 5079 5428 5442 5373 5809 5590 5702 5465 5469MHHID 882 864 951 765 944 1036 1287 1358 1947 1811 1584 1706 1642 1395 1674 1449 1790 1587 1405 1540
52-59 Retail Trade HHI 3960 4052 4204 4404 4221 4459 4590 4454 4507 4178 4298 4443 4772 4862 4724 5051 4714 4379 4623 4577MHHID 1102 1224 1372 1211 1330 1293 1423 1438 1645 1957 1949 1578 1596 1282 1449 1542 1902 1908 1770 2243
60-67 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate HHI 3736 3708 3724 3545 3534 3693 3462 3220 3629 3603 3867 3886 4455 4393 4253 3971 3866 3909 3722 3693MHHID 1121 1068 1009 1226 1216 1485 1579 1826 1829 1948 1725 1468 1753 1712 1880 1981 2016 1903 1837 1968
70-89 Services HHI 4766 4827 4601 4378 4202 4354 4507 4489 4627 4344 4502 4716 4629 4984 4983 5162 4929 4813 4667 4952MHHID 926 799 919 926 924 1060 989 1039 1225 1173 1231 1038 1043 925 1039 1296 1639 1817 1728 1572
47
Table 3. Panel A: Fraction of Firms in which Investor X is the Largest Shareholder, by Industry.
This table reports the average proportion of firms in two-digit SIC industries for which a given investor is the largest shareholder as of
June 2013.
2-digit SIC Industries
Firms with 01-09 10-14 15-17 20-39 40-49 50-51 52-59 60-67 70-89
top shareholder Agriculture, Mining Construction Manufact Transport Wholesale Retail Finance, Services
Forestry, Public Trade Trade Insurance,
Fishing Utilit Real Estate
BlackRock 655 7.7% 12.9% 26.0% 16.6% 20.7% 12.5% 11.4% 16.9% 10.4%
Vanguard 222 0.0% 2.7% 0.0% 3.9% 4.8% 1.8% 5.2% 10.9% 2.4%
State Str 25 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 1.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.3% 0.2%
Dimensional Fund Advisors 193 0.0% 2.7% 4.0% 5.4% 2.7% 5.4% 5.7% 5.8% 2.7%
The Northern Trust Co. 4 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Fidelity 347 7.7% 3.7% 10.0% 8.9% 4.1% 14.3% 18.0% 5.7% 10.9%
Mellon Asset Management 10 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2%
Wellington 146 0.0% 2.7% 4.0% 2.4% 2.4% 1.8% 0.9% 7.3% 2.1%
T. Rowe Price 175 0.0% 3.4% 6.0% 4.0% 3.1% 2.7% 10.9% 2.5% 6.0%
JP Morgan 30 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 0.7% 1.0% 1.8% 0.9% 0.2% 0.9%
Royce & Associates 97 15.4% 1.4% 2.0% 3.8% 1.0% 5.4% 3.8% 0.9% 1.2%
Renaissance Tech. Corp 67 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 2.3% 2.2% 3.6% 0.5% 0.0% 2.7%
Invesco 20 0.0% 1.4% 2.0% 0.6% 0.2% 0.9% 0.5% 0.1% 0.5%
Capital Group 116 0.0% 4.4% 2.0% 3.6% 4.1% 0.0% 2.8% 1.5% 1.7%
Goldman Sachs 19 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.5% 0.9% 0.0% 0.5% 0.5%
Table 3. Panel B: Fraction of Firms in which Investor X is among the Largest Ten Shareholders, by Industry.
This table reports the average proportion of firms in two-digit SIC industries for which a given investor is among the largest ten
shareholders as of June 2013.
2-digit SIC Industries
Firms with 01-09 10-14 15-17 20-39 40-49 50-51 52-59 60-67 70-89
top 10 shareholder Agriculture, Mining Construction Manufact Transport Wholesale Retail Finance, Services
(Universe of Forestry, Public Trade Trade Insurance,
4676 firms) Fishing Utilit Real Estate
BlackRock 3025 54% 53% 80% 76% 68% 70% 86% 69% 72%
Vanguard 3038 46% 51% 74% 77% 61% 72% 85% 72% 74%
State Str 1625 38% 33% 34% 39% 39% 30% 58% 42% 30%
Dimensional Fund Advisors 1531 38% 24% 42% 38% 29% 43% 42% 41% 33%
The Northern Trust Co. 904 23% 17% 12% 22% 25% 26% 18% 27% 14%
Fidelity 1292 23% 26% 38% 31% 25% 37% 41% 27% 35%
Mellon Asset Management 655 8% 8% 14% 18% 19% 15% 22% 15% 10%
Wellington 787 8% 16% 26% 18% 13% 17% 20% 24% 17%
T. Rowe Price 753 0% 15% 22% 20% 17% 13% 25% 14% 19%
JP Morgan 539 8% 14% 12% 11% 17% 17% 19% 13% 11%
Royce & Associates 533 31% 7% 16% 20% 6% 22% 13% 6% 11%
Renaissance Tech. Corp 680 31% 11% 10% 20% 16% 16% 18% 10% 20%
Invesco 478 15% 8% 18% 11% 13% 5% 11% 12% 12%
Capital Group 451 8% 12% 10% 12% 14% 4% 12% 8% 11%






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4. Panel regressions: top management pay as a function of own-firm and rival profits, market concentration,
and common ownership.
This table presents the effects of product market differentiation (HHI) and common ownership (MHHID) on total compensation (TDC1)
as described in equation (36). An industry is defined at the CRSP 4-digit SIC code. Column 1 presents the Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999a) set-up – own and rival profits, and product market differentiation, and their interactions – complemented with industry and year
fixed effects. Column 2 adds the measure of common ownership (MHHID) and the interactions with own and rival profits. Column 3
adds controls. Columns 4 and 5 run run specification 3 on the CEO and non-CEO subsample. Panel B reports the inverse compensation
ratio test as described in equation (38): S is the change in the ratio of rival-firm pay-performance sensitivity over own pay-performance
sensitivity (i.e. β
α
) relative to the cdf of common ownership (MHHID). All standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
PANEL A Dependent Variable: Top Management Pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Own * MHHID -0.117** -0.0918** -0.178 -0.0823**
(-2.057) (-2.145) (-1.525) (-2.509)
Rival * MHHID 0.148** 0.106** 0.244* 0.108***
(2.451) (2.257) (1.856) (2.967)
MHHID 888.2*** 99.80 467.1** 41.90
(9.007) (1.404) (2.503) (0.742)
Own * HHI 0.137*** 0.0543 -0.0604 -0.132 -0.0477
(4.473) (1.117) (-1.544) (-1.214) (-1.606)
Rival * HHI -0.128*** -0.0322 0.0676 0.181 0.0677*
(-3.345) (-0.568) (1.516) (1.456) (1.948)
HHI -74.42 484.1*** -366.8*** -638.6*** -328.3***
(-0.815) (4.535) (-4.830) (-3.251) (-5.438)
Own 0.226*** 0.330*** 0.230*** 0.546*** 0.183***
(15.43) (6.043) (5.472) (4.847) (5.736)
Rival 0.325*** 0.182*** -0.0183 -0.0755 -0.0283
(18.65) (3.089) (-0.391) (-0.581) (-0.786)
Ceo 2,237***
(79.32)
Log(Sales) 784.4*** 1,817*** 604.5***
(44.56) (42.23) (44.84)
Volatility 3,733*** 6,604*** 2,955***
(10.42) (7.494) (10.88)
Tenure 35.91*** -10.48 31.14***
(9.613) (-0.979) (10.91)
Observations 192,110 192,110 183,133 33,053 150,080
R-squared 0.160 0.164 0.463 0.445 0.407
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PANEL B
Hypothesis test at the median (F(HHI)=0.5 and F(MHHID)=0.5)
Inverse Comp. Ratio Test 0.242*** 0.147*** 0.306** 0.150***
P-Value 0.006 0.008 0.041 0.001
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Table 5. Panel regressions with alternative industry definitions.
This table shows robustness of the results from Table 4 across industry definitions. Column 1 is the reference specification (column
3 in Table 3). Column 2 refines the definition of the rival group as the size tertile within the 4-digit SIC code, as in Albuquerque
(2009). Columns 3 and 4 use the alternative industry definition proposed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010) (HP) at the 400 level for
the benchmark, and the size split specifications, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 present results at the more aggregated SIC3 and HP
300 levels. All specifications have industry and year fixed effects and a full set of controls. Panel B reports the inverse compensation
ratio test as described in equation (38): S is the change in the ratio of rival-firm pay-performance sensitivity over own pay-performance
sensitivity (i.e. β
α
) relative to the cdf of common ownership (MHHID). All standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
PANEL A Dependent Variable: Top Management Pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own * MHHID -0.0918** -0.111*** -0.0978** -0.153*** -0.0792** -0.0800*
(-2.145) (-2.678) (-2.140) (-3.193) (-2.066) (-1.825)
Rival * MHHID 0.106** 0.0987** 0.0181 0.0778 0.0204 0.00341
(2.257) (2.346) (0.324) (1.413) (0.446) (0.0697)
MHHID 99.80 366.7*** 432.4*** 619.9*** 201.0*** 418.2***
(1.404) (5.676) (5.791) (9.431) (3.070) (5.870)
Own * HHI -0.0604 -0.0889** -0.0122 -0.0541 -0.0141 -0.0207
(-1.544) (-2.266) (-0.337) (-1.421) (-0.400) (-0.545)
Rival * HHI 0.0676 0.0687 0.00797 0.0575 -0.0249 0.00427
(1.516) (1.626) (0.149) (1.092) (-0.545) (0.0857)
HHI -366.8*** -212.8*** 146.9* 199.1*** -324.5*** 46.76
(-4.830) (-3.175) (1.895) (2.980) (-4.264) (0.688)
Own 0.230*** 0.262*** 0.214*** 0.276*** 0.203*** 0.205***
(5.472) (6.086) (4.958) (5.705) (5.711) (4.794)
Rival -0.0183 -0.0336 0.116** 0.0399 0.0936** 0.118**
(-0.391) (-0.751) (2.110) (0.682) (2.117) (2.427)
Ceo 2,237*** 2,236*** 2,274*** 2,275*** 2,253*** 2,271***
(79.32) (79.29) (77.24) (77.31) (80.84) (77.34)
Log(Sales) 784.4*** 779.0*** 779.7*** 762.3*** 771.3*** 783.1***
(44.56) (43.62) (44.16) (41.62) (45.17) (44.26)
Volatility 3,733*** 3,772*** 3,691*** 3,733*** 3,690*** 3,675***
(10.42) (10.52) (10.44) (10.51) (10.72) (10.55)
Tenure 35.91*** 35.46*** 32.87*** 32.22*** 35.09*** 33.18***
(9.613) (9.535) (8.789) (8.663) (9.725) (8.918)
Observations 183,133 182,601 166,027 165,915 194,192 166,541
R-squared 0.463 0.464 0.458 0.459 0.463 0.458
Industry Def SIC4 SIC4-Size HP400 HP400-Size SIC3 HP300
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PANEL B
Hypothesis test at the median (F(HHI)=0.5 and F(MHHID)=0.5)
Inverse Comp. Ratio Test 0.147*** 0.133*** 0.978 0.173*** 0.066 0.067
P-Value 0.008 0.003 0.172 0.005 0.238 0.305
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Table 6. Panel-IV: First stage regressions.
This table presents the first stage of the IV analysis. Following the methodology in Anton and Polk (2014) we predict the values for
MHHID and the interactions of MHHID with Own and Rival profits with the ratio of common ownership that comes from scandalous
fund with respect to total common ownership as of September 2003 interacted with the respective profit measure. Columns 1 to 3
correspond to SIC4 and columns 4 to 6 to Hoberg and Phillips (2010) (HP) industry definitions, respectively. We include all controls
present in the second stage. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variables MHHID Own*MHHID Rival*MHHID MHHID Own*MHHID Rival*MHHID
Ratio -0.0618*** 15.56 -10.17 0.237*** -26.98* 0.366
(-8.263) (1.131) (-0.790) (21.20) (-1.731) (0.0271)
MHHID03 0.407*** -47.19*** -43.30*** 0.489*** -38.96*** -32.29***
(73.50) (-4.633) (-4.542) (93.76) (-5.354) (-5.119)
Own * Ratio 1.87e-05*** -0.0200** 0.0806*** -4.74e-05*** -0.0666*** -0.0539***
(3.879) (-2.254) (9.715) (-5.468) (-5.502) (-5.146)
Own * MHHID03 8.88e-07 0.478*** 0.0438*** -5.97e-06 0.574*** 0.00778
(0.258) (75.46) (7.382) (-1.488) (102.7) (1.606)
Rival * Ratio 5.08e-06 0.0787*** -0.0279*** -4.47e-05*** -0.0260* -0.0201
(0.948) (7.987) (-3.024) (-4.237) (-1.766) (-1.574)
Rival * MHHID03 3.76e-06 0.0298*** 0.443*** -1.91e-05*** -0.00707 0.516***
(1.004) (4.315) (68.69) (-3.943) (-1.045) (88.07)
Own * HHI -5.68e-06* -0.364*** 0.0645*** 8.49e-06*** -0.265*** 0.0636***
(-1.825) (-63.65) (12.04) (2.576) (-57.56) (15.97)
Rival * HHI 1.49e-05*** 0.0706*** -0.381*** -1.80e-05*** 0.0405*** -0.363***
(4.253) (10.93) (-63.11) (-4.256) (6.852) (-70.91)
HHI -0.435*** -58.99*** -21.93** -0.348*** -35.36*** -20.01***
(-82.70) (-6.099) (-2.422) (-71.81) (-5.239) (-3.421)
Own -2.00e-06 0.511*** -0.0617*** 1.06e-05** 0.477*** -0.0164***
(-0.539) (75.00) (-9.676) (2.337) (75.25) (-2.980)
Rival -8.42e-06** -0.0505*** 0.548*** 2.84e-05*** -0.00925 0.539***
(-2.036) (-6.644) (77.01) (5.152) (-1.202) (80.76)
Ceo 0.00134 1.395 0.214 -0.00225 -2.958 -1.279
(0.510) (0.289) (0.0474) (-0.942) (-0.888) (-0.443)
Log(Sales) 0.0212*** 8.858*** 8.523*** 0.0266*** 6.059*** 3.138***
(24.99) (5.692) (5.850) (32.22) (5.264) (3.145)
Volatility -0.161*** 127.7*** 101.2*** 0.00686 -56.83** 26.83
(-8.392) (3.620) (3.064) (0.393) (-2.334) (1.271)
Tenure -0.000178 -0.117 0.0754 0.000940*** 0.888*** 0.724**
(-0.671) (-0.240) (0.165) (3.889) (2.632) (2.476)
Observations 26,976 26,976 26,976 29,098 29,098 29,098
R-squared 0.654 0.959 0.954 0.652 0.981 0.977
Industry Def SIC4-Size SIC4-Size SIC4-Size HP400-Size HP400-Size HP400-Size
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7. Panel-IV: Second stage regressions.
This table uses the fitted values for MHHID and their interactions with Own and Rival profits from the previous table to estimate the
impact of the 2003 mutual fund scandal on total compensation. Rivals are defined both with the four-digit CRSP SIC code (columns
1 and 2) and Hoberg and Phillips (2010) (HP) 400 index (columns 3 and 4), respectively. The result of interest is reported in Panel B:
the inverse compensation ratio as described in equation (38). S is the change in the ratio of rival-firm pay-performance sensitivity over
own pay-performance sensitivity (i.e. β
α
) relative to the cdf of common ownership (MHHID). All standard errors are clustered at the
firm level.
PANEL A Dependent Variable: Top Management Pay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own * MHHID -0.427** -0.336** -0.178 -0.232
(-2.158) (-2.126) (-0.980) (-1.576)
Rival * MHHID 0.339 0.268 0.553* 0.416*
(1.356) (1.346) (1.836) (1.853)
MHHID 1,140*** 874.5*** 897.2*** 829.5***
(3.878) (3.720) (3.644) (4.189)
Own * HHI -0.244 -0.181 -0.0955 -0.132
(-1.592) (-1.451) (-0.658) (-1.202)
Rival * HHI 0.153 0.132 0.324 0.271
(0.762) (0.835) (1.350) (1.509)
HHI 416.8** 308.3* 591.0*** 525.8***
(1.998) (1.837) (3.554) (3.962)
Own 0.582*** 0.452*** 0.331* 0.354**
(3.001) (2.900) (1.711) (2.283)
Rival -0.155 -0.129 -0.320 -0.235
(-0.617) (-0.643) (-0.991) (-0.979)
Ceo 2,362*** 2,402***
(52.63) (55.12)
Log(Sales) 762.1*** 590.6*** 717.4*** 543.9***
(26.80) (26.13) (23.86) (23.03)
Volatility 3,939*** 3,110*** 3,641*** 2,882***
(8.205) (7.970) (7.424) (7.200)
Tenure 28.24*** 29.64*** 27.94*** 30.23***
(4.976) (6.634) (5.163) (7.076)
Observations 24,989 20,416 26,937 22,001
R-squared 0.511 0.461 0.513 0.461
Industry Def SIC4-Size SIC4-Size HP400-Size HP400-Size
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
PANEL B
Hypothesis test at the median (F(HHI)=0.5 and F(MHHID)=0.5)
Inverse Comp. Ratio Test 0.497** 0.392** 0.661** 0.561***
P-Value 0.044 0.044 0.023 0.005
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Appendix A: Related Literature
The existing literature has recognized links between (i) imperfect competition and (ii) optimal
incentive contracts as well as between (iii) common ownership and (i) imperfect competition. This
paper closes the triangle between all three concepts (i)-(iii) by establishing a link between (iii)
common ownership and (ii) optimal incentive contracts.
The most closely related paper is Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) (henceforth AS), who ex-
amine theoretically and empirically how the (optimal) use of RPE is related to product mar-
ket competition, as measured by the HHI index of market concentration. By contrast, we are
interested in how RPE relates to common ownership concentration in the industry (measured
by O’Brien and Salop (2000)’s MHHI delta (MHHID), whereas total market concentration is
MHHI = HHI +MHHID), holding fixed the traditional HHI measure of concentration.
The key differences from AS are as follows. First, theoretically, AS show that the relation
between HHI and RPE depends on whether firms compete à la Bertrand or Cournot.14 By contrast,
we show that the effect of common ownership on the use of RPE is unambiguously negative.
Second, we offer an even more extensive empirical treatment. We start with baseline specifications
that are similar to AS’s, except for the additional measure of concentration employed. Specifically,
AS are interested in the coefficients of HHI×πi and HHI×πj (where πi is the firm’s performance
andπj is the rivals’ performance) and we are primarily interested in the coefficients ofMHHID×πi
and MHHID × πj. An important difference is that in addition to exploiting variation across
industries in HHI and MHHID, we can also identify the effect from time-series changes in those
measures in a given industry. Moreover, we are able to identify the effect of common ownership
concentration on RPE with plausibly exogenous variation in ownership resulting from from a
14AS follow theoretical precursors on contracting with RPE by Holmstrom (1982) and Diamond and Verrechia
(1982) as well as papers that examine the relation between incentive pay and product market competition by
Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), Fumas (1992), and Meyer and Vickers (1997). Other theoretical
papers studying the interaction between managerial incentives and product market competition include Hart (1983),
Scharfstein (1988), Hermalin (1992), Schmidt (1997), Raith (2003), Vives (2004), and Baggs and de Bettignies
(2007) while Cunat and Guadalupe (2005, 2009) provide empirical evidence.
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trading scandal in 2003 affecting some mutual funds more than others, as exploited previously by
Anton and Polk (2014).15
The theoretical idea that shareholder diversification leads to managerial incentive problems
to which contracts need to be adapted has been around at least since Arrow (1962).16 Gordon
(1990) is the first to study (linear) RPE contracts under common ownership.17 In Gordon’s
model, common ownership is modeled by exogenous positive effort spillovers on other firms in
the industry. We model increases in common ownership explicitly. Similarly, his model does not
feature any product market interactions. Our model makes these interactions explicit, and in
particular separately investigates the Cournot and Bertrand case.18
Our paper also contributes to the large empirical and theoretical literature that examines the
lack as well as the causes for the limited empirical support for RPE.19 Broadly speaking, two
classes of explanations exist for this lack of empirical support: “measurement” and “economics.”
The “measurement” class of papers refines measures of pay and redefines the market definition
(or, more precisely, the industry classification). Jayaraman et al. (2015) find more support for
RPE after such modifications. We show that the “common ownership” effect is comparatively
robust: it is present both when SIC or Hoberg-Phillips industry classifications are used to define
competitors (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, 2016).20
15A more detailed description of the scandal is given by Zitzewitz (2006) and Zitzewitz (2009). Kisin (2011) uses
the same shock for different purposes.
16“[A]ny individual stockholder can reduce his risk by buying only a small part of the stock and diversifying
his portfolio to achieve his own preferred risk level. But then again the actual managers no longer receive the
full reward of their decisions; the shifting of risks is again accompanied by a weakening of incentives to efficiency.
Substitute motivations [...] such as executive compensation and profit sharing [...] may be found”
17Similar arguments have since been discussed in variations by Hansen and Lott (1996), Rubin (2006), and Kraus
and Rubin (2006).
18Other papers that study the interplay of financial contracts and product market competition include Brander
and Lewis (1986), Maksimovic (1988), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Scharfstein (1990), Chevalier (1995a,b),
Phillips (1995), and Kovenock and Phillips (1997).
19Significant contributions to this literature include Antle and Smith (1986), Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Barro
and Barro (1990), Janakiraman et al. (1992), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001b),
Garvey and Milbourn (2006), and Jenter and Kanaan (2015) as well as the surveys by Murphy (1999), Bebchuk and
Fried (2003), and Frydman and Jenter (2010). A closely related literature debates how (quantitatively) sensitive
pay has to be to performance to effectively incentivize managers (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Haubrich, 1994; Hall
and Liebman, 1998).
20Relatedly, De Angelis and Grinstein (2014) find that the use of relative performance provisions in compensation
contracts is limited to select industries. Albuquerque (2009) argues that when peers are composed of similar
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The “economics” class of responses proposes economic explanations for the absence or reduced
importance of RPE. These explanations include career concerns and implicit incentives (Meyer
and Vickers, 1997; Garvey and Milbourn, 2003; Core and Guay, 2003), product market competi-
tion (Fumas, 1992; Joh, 1999; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a), aggregate shocks (Himmelberg and
Hubbard, 2000), the absence of an appropriate comparison group (Albuquerque, 2014), outside
opportunities (Oyer, 2004), and “keeping up with the Joneses” preferences (DeMarzo and Kaniel,
2016).21 Given that the explanation we emphasize operates through aligning the objective func-
tion of the firm with shareholders’ economic incentives, our paper is more closely related to the
“economics” than to the “measurement” class of explanations for the difficulty of finding RPE in
the data.
The present paper also relates to a literature and a continuing public debate on the causes
of the increase in CEO pay over the past decades that is not entirely explained by observable
changes (Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Gabaix and Landier, 2008). In particular, we show that
the rise of common ownership can explain part of the unexplained increase in top executive pay,
both theoretically and empirically.
Our paper is further related to a recent stream of literature that investigates the causes and
consequences of “common ownership” of firms. In particular, Azar et al. (2015, 2016) argue that
common ownership causes higher product prices in the airline and banking industries, respectively.
The present paper provides a first answer to the question of how anti-competitive shareholder
incentives resulting from common ownership are translated into the anti-competitive behavior of
firms. Our paper shows that managerial incentives are, at least to some extent, aligned with
common shareholders’ anti-competitive incentives. It also supports the view that anti-competitive
effects caused by common ownership can obtain without “collusion,” that is, without direct or
indirect coordination between firms. This insight informs a vivid debate in the legal literature
industry-size firms, evidence is consistent with the use of RPE in CEO compensation.
21Among those, our theoretical analysis is closest in spirit to Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) and DeMarzo and
Kaniel (2016) who both study moral hazard models with linear RPE contracts. Whereas the former paper focuses
on product market competition, the latter investigates the role of relative wealth concerns.
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over whether the findings documented by Azar et al. (2015, 2016) constitute a violation of antitrust
laws, and which tools are necessary to enforce them (Elhauge, 2016; Baker, 2016).22
Finally, the summary statistics on common ownership concentration (MHHID), the main
right-hand-side variable in our study, are a significant contribution to the fast-growing literature
on common ownership. Previous papers have provided measures of ownership for various markets
within an industry, but none has calculated common ownership concentration (MHHID) across
several industries and across time.
Appendix B: Additional Theoretical Results
A Moral Hazard, Risk Aversion, and Multi-tasking
The following model extension has the dual purpose of showing the robustness of the key result,
and of generating an additional, more nuanced testable prediction. Consider the following multi-
tasking moral hazard model. Two firms, each employing a risk-averse manager with exponential
utility who receives a linear compensation scheme given by
wi = ki + αiπi + βiπj, (26)
where the profits of firm i are given by
πi = e1,i + he2,j + ν, (27)
where ν is a common shock that is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2.
22A significant fraction of common ownership stems from ownership by investors with predominantly passive
investment strategies. So-called “passive” investors are known to influence corporate governance more generally
(Appel et al., 2016). Schmalz (2015), Azar et al. (2015), and Schmalz (2016) go yet one level deeper and discuss the
potential roles of shareholder engagement, hedge fund activism, and shareholder voting in implementing outcomes
consistent with shareholders’ anticompetitive incentives. Brav et al. (2008) and Keusch (2016) provide empirical
support for the prediction that activist hedge funds reduce CEO pay and implement steeper pay-for-performance
contracts (activists tend to not be common owners of firms within the same industry).
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Each manager i can exert two types of effort: productive effort e1,i which increases own firm
profits, or competitive effort e2,i which influences the rival firm’s profits. The impact of competitive
effort can either be positive or negative depending on the sign of h. If h = 0, the two firms are
essentially two separate monopolists. Thus, competitive effort e2,i can be thought of as a reduced-
form way of modeling competitive product market interaction between the two firms. Note that
competitive effort e2,i can take both positive and negative values. For simplicity, we assume that
the cost for both types of effort is quadratic.
There are two owners, A and B. As before, we assume that they are symmetric such that
A owns a share x ≥ 1/2 of firm 1 and 1 − x of firm 2, and B owns 1 − x of firm 1 and x of
firm 2. Each majority owner sets an incentive contract (ki, αi, βi) for her manager i such that
it maximizes the profit shares of the owner at both firms subject to individual rationality and
incentive compatibility constraints.
The incentive compatibility constraints yield the optimal effort levels for both types of effort:
e1,i = αi and e2,i = hβi. (28)
We can rewrite the manager’s utility in terms of his certainty equivalent. After substituting
for the binding individual rationality and the two incentive compatibility constraints, the maxi-
mization problem of the majority owner of firm i becomes
max
αi,βi







2 − r2(αi + βi)
2σ2) (29)







2 − r2(αj + βj)
2σ2). (30)
Thus, the first order conditions for αi and βi are given by
1− αi − rσ2(αi + βi)2 = 0x(−h2β2i − rσ2(αi + βi)2) + xh2 = 0. (31)
Because the two firms are symmetric we can drop the i subscript. Solving this system of
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equations yields the optimal incentive slopes:
α∗ = 1− 1
x
h2rσ2
h2rσ2 + h2 + rσ2β
∗ = −1 + 1
x
h2rσ2 + h2
h2rσ2 + h2 + rσ2 . (32)
It is straightforward to show that 0 < α∗ < 1 and α∗ > β∗. Furthermore, in terms of absolute
value, the incentives on own profits are always stronger than on rival profits; that is, α∗ > |β∗|.
Most importantly, this model also yields our main prediction that the own-profit incentive slope
α∗ is decreasing while the rival-profit incentive slope β∗ is increasing in the degree of common
ownership 1− x.
Proposition 2. The optimal incentive slope on own profits α∗ is decreasing and the optimal
incentive slope on rival profits β∗ is increasing in 1− x for 1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1.
In addition, the model has all the natural features of moral hazard with linear contracts. The
optimal incentive slope for α∗ is distorted away from the first-best of 1 because of two factors:
the manager’s risk aversion r and the impact of competitive effort on the other firm h. When the
manager has no influence on the profits of the other firm (h = 0), the first best (α∗ = 1) can be
achieved through a strong RPE by setting β∗ = −1, thereby completely filtering out all noise ν in
the firm’s profits. The higher the impact on the other firm h, the degree of risk aversion r, and
the variance σ2, the more strongly the two incentive slopes are distorted away from the first best.
The model also allows us to analytically solve for the optimal level of base pay k∗ by substituting
the agent’s equilibrium competitive efforts into the binding IR constraint of the manager. In




2(α∗ + β∗)2 − (α∗ + β∗)(α∗ + h2β∗). (33)
Substituting the optimal values of α∗ and β∗ and differentiating with respect to x yields the
following predicted effect of common ownership on managerial base pay.
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Proposition 3. The optimal base pay k∗ is increasing in 1 − x for 1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1 if |h| and r are
sufficiently large.
In other words, unconditional base pay increases in the degree of common ownership. The
owner trades off two conflicting aims of RPE: providing risk insurance from the common shock
to the manager and incentivizing managerial choices that affect the rival firm. If the manager
has no influence on the profits of the other firm (e.g., h = 0), then the second consideration is
absent. Hence, it is always optimal for the owner to use strong RPE by setting β∗ = −α∗, thereby
completely filtering out all the common noise in the firm’s profits and providing perfect insurance
to the manager. However, if the manager’s actions also affect the rival firm, it will no longer
be optimal to set β∗ = −α∗ because doing so would lead to excessively competitive behavior on
behalf of the manager. But this incomplete filtering of common noise now exposes the risk-averse
manager to some compensation risk. Given that the manager is risk-averse, meeting his outside
option now requires paying a higher base wage k∗.
Finally, note that the model also predicts that the equilibrium incentive slope on rival-firm
profits β∗ can be positive for sufficiently high levels of common ownership. In particular, β∗ > 0
if and only if x < h2rσ2+h2
h2rσ2+h2+rσ2 .
B Moral Hazard, Risk Aversion, and Product Market Competition
Our baseline model abstracts from managerial risk aversion and the moral hazard problem
that exists between shareholders and managers. Consider therefore the following change to our
Bertrand product market competition model to incorporate an effort choice, a disutility of effort,
a common performance shock, and risk aversion. Each agent’s compensation contract is still given
by
wi = ki + αiπi + βiπj, (34)
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where
πi = (pi − c)(B − dpi + epj) + tmi + ν. (35)
The profit function now includes the agent’s effort mi, the marginal return to effort t, and a
common shock ν that is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2.
The agent has exponential utility and her certainty equivalent is








where s is the marginal cost of effort and r is the agent’s risk aversion.
Rewriting the binding agent’s individual rationality constraint in certainty equivalent terms
yields the agent’s maximization problem:
max
mi,pi







With this additively separate setup, the agents’ optimal price choices remain the same functions





which is unaffected by the price choice.
After substituting for the manager’s binding individual rationality constraint the maximization
problem of the majority owner of firm i becomes
max
αi,βi

















Generally solving the system of equations that results from the first order conditions of the
two owners is not analytically feasible, even for the symmetric equilibrium. However, we can
solve the system numerically to generate comparative statics. Consider first the following extreme
case. When there is no product substitution a = 0 (hence e = 0), each firm is a separate
monopolist. In the case of completely separate ownership (x = 1), the unique optimal contract is
{α∗ = 1, β∗ = −1}, which is an RPE contract that completely filters out the common shock ν.
That is, in the absence of strategic considerations, the optimal contract involves a large negative
incentive slope β∗. More generally, for the case of some product substitutability a > 0, the optimal
contracts will put positive weight on both the own and the rival firms, α∗ ∈ (0, 1], β∗ ∈ (0, 1).
From our previous analysis, we know that as we move to more common ownership increases, the
optimal β∗ increases because the owners induce a softening of competition through the incentive
contracts. This change in β∗ came at no cost in our baseline model, but in the augmented model
with moral hazard and risk aversion, it imposes more risk on the agent because the optimal
contract no longer completely filters out the common shock ν. The manager, however, has to be
compensated for this increase in risk, and therefore the base pay k∗ has to be higher to induce him
to accept the contract. The following proposition formalizes this intuition and yields an additional
testable implication. Note that we are unable to solve the system of equations analytically, but
the following proposition which mirrors Proposition 3, holds for all of our numerical simulations
if product substitutability and risk aversion are sufficiently large.
Proposition 4. The optimal base pay k∗ is increasing in 1 − x for 1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1 if a and r are
sufficiently large.
C Managerial Conflict of Interest
Our baseline model is similar to the setup in Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a). It assumes that in the absence of explicit incentives in the form
of αi and βi, the manager of firm i is completely indifferent when it comes to making strategic
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decisions. In fact, if he were to receive incentives αi = βi = 0 he would just make random choices.
However, as soon as the manager is given any non-zero αi, the compensation ratio completely
pins down his optimal output or price choice. Thus, unlike in our extensions that consider moral
hazard and managerial effort choice only a minimal conflict of interest exists between the manager
and the owner of the firm.
Consider instead a more realistic model of managerial decision-making with a different conflict
of interest in which each manager also derives private benefits from maximizing his own firm’s
profits. These private benefits could arise from managerial perks or career concerns. Denote the
strength of these private benefits by P . Thus, manager i’s utility function is now given by
Ui = Pπi + wi = Pπi + ki + αiπi + βiπj. (40)
When deciding how to set incentives, the majority owner of firm i now has to take into account
that manager i is motivated by private benefits. However, the only change in the model’s result that
these private benefits induce is that the owner now has to set the adjusted inverse compensation
ratio βi
P+αi correctly. Because P is just a constant our main result regarding the unambiguous
effect of common ownership on the inverse compensation ratio remains unchanged.
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Appendix C: Additional Empirical Results
Table A. I. Panel regressions with a market share-free measure of common ownership.
This table reports the effect of common ownership on wealth-performance sensitivity, whereas wealth-performance sensitivity measures
are taken directly from Edmans et al. (2012) and cover the years 1999 until 2003. Columns 1 to 4 report the regressions using the
scaled wealth-performance sensitivity (lnB1) as the dependent variable, with common ownership (MHHID) as the explanatory variable
of interest, and various combinations of HHI and log of sales as controls. Columns 5 and 6 show the robustness of the results to the
alternative B2 (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) and B3 (Hall and Liebman, 1998) definitions of wealth-performance sensitivities, also taken
from Edmans et al. (2012).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable ln(B1) ln(B1) ln(B1) ln(B1) ln(B2) ln(B3)
MHHID -0.372*** -0.598*** -0.367*** -0.598*** -0.447*** -0.444***
(-4.117) (-5.936) (-3.989) (-5.496) (-4.414) (-4.129)
HHI -0.338*** -0.337*** -0.197* -0.436***
(-3.331) (-3.139) (-1.957) (-3.979)
Log(Sale) -0.00831 -0.000520 -0.480*** 0.414***
(-0.488) (-0.0295) (-29.18) (24.37)
Observations 26,430 26,430 26,430 26,430 26,430 26,430
R-squared 0.075 0.076 0.075 0.076 0.300 0.174
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A. II. Panel regressions with alternative common ownership measure.
This table presents specifications similar to those in Table 4, whereas the common ownership measure varies. Instead of using actual
market shares to compute the O’Brien and Salop (2000) MHHID, we use the ratio of one divided by the number of firms in the industry.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SIC4-Size SIC4-Size SIC4-Size SIC4-Size HP4-Size HP4-Size HP4-Size HP4-Size
Own * MHHID -0.125*** -0.0767** -0.223** -0.0596** -0.110** -0.106*** -0.197* -0.0820**
(-2.705) (-2.109) (-2.166) (-2.115) (-2.110) (-2.579) (-1.706) (-2.564)
Rival * MHHID 0.137*** 0.0912** 0.181* 0.0848*** 0.109* 0.0543 0.248* 0.0651*
(2.692) (2.424) (1.741) (2.770) (1.744) (1.098) (1.755) (1.650)
MHHID 1,352*** 394.9*** 963.2*** 297.8*** 1,663*** 424.3*** 1,192*** 318.3***
(17.36) (7.193) (6.485) (6.939) (21.25) (7.185) (7.754) (6.795)
Own * HHI 0.0427 -0.0471 -0.126 -0.0281 0.0721* 0.00549 0.0121 0.00235
(1.260) (-1.621) (-1.539) (-1.273) (1.696) (0.179) (0.126) (0.0951)
Rival * HHI -0.0538 0.0392 0.127 0.0348 -0.117* 0.0176 -0.00861 0.0265
(-1.239) (1.190) (1.404) (1.334) (-1.925) (0.395) (-0.0657) (0.743)
HHI 306.4*** -313.2*** -729.9*** -263.3*** 750.9*** -11.51 -48.74 -13.08
(3.762) (-5.451) (-4.904) (-5.772) (8.766) (-0.188) (-0.297) (-0.270)
Own 0.345*** 0.222*** 0.596*** 0.166*** 0.268*** 0.214*** 0.481*** 0.163***
(8.157) (6.472) (6.265) (6.335) (5.702) (5.842) (4.635) (5.717)
Rival 0.153*** -0.0181 -0.0620 -0.0178 0.348*** 0.0762 0.105 0.0472
(3.143) (-0.488) (-0.613) (-0.596) (5.677) (1.585) (0.774) (1.236)
Ceo 2,236*** 2,275***
(79.29) (77.29)
Log(Sale) 779.2*** 1,810*** 600.3*** 774.4*** 1,815*** 592.5***
(44.28) (42.15) (44.69) (42.77) (41.24) (42.86)
Volatility 3,759*** 6,622*** 2,981*** 3,740*** 6,573*** 2,980***
(10.45) (7.481) (10.93) (10.48) (7.450) (10.99)
Tenure 35.44*** -11.29 30.76*** 32.52*** -22.20** 30.26***
(9.535) (-1.057) (10.86) (8.717) (-2.092) (10.60)
Observations 191,557 182,601 32,952 149,649 165,915 165,915 29,986 135,929
R-squared 0.169 0.464 0.446 0.408 0.173 0.458 0.444 0.399
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PANEL B
Hypothesis test at the median: F(HHI)=0.5 and F(MHHID)=0.5
Inverse Comp Ratio 0.217*** 0.114*** 0.230** 0.105*** 0.261*** 0.127** 0.362** 0.127***
P-Value 0.001 0.004 0.033 0.002 0.010 0.029 0.029 0.008
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